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Interest groups often seek to influence the progression of bills through Congress by calling on
legislators to support a bill by becoming a cosponsor. Groups rarely do this alone. Rather, a chorus of
interest groups calls for cosponsors. Legislators can use this coalition as a heuristic for if supporting a
bill is electorally advantageous. I examine the effectiveness of interest group position taking through
the lens of partisan differences in the interest group environment. I find that Democrats face both a
higher number of signals and fewer “repeat players” and that they are less likely to cosponsor as a
result of an ideologically diverse coalition. This suggests that Democrats use interest group signals
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Members of Congress face a challenge: with limited time and information, they must support
legislation that provides them an electoral benefit and avoid legislation that could be an electoral
liability. To do this, legislators must rely on outside sources of information to determine which bills
are worthy of support, often in the form of cosponsorship. In addition to research staff, party leaders,
and direct communication with constituents, legislators rely on interest groups to provide information
about the desires of their constituency (Hansen 1991) as well as issue salience (Ainsworth 1993).
Interest groups regularly take public positions and send messages to Congress on behalf of the
members of the group. Most often, these messages direct legislators to either support or oppose
specific a bill, and, in the case of supportive messages, ask members to support a bill by attaching
their name to the bill by becoming a cosponsor.
Legislators, for their part, must choose carefully. Interest groups have strong incentives to
exaggerate their influence or overstate the importance of an issue. The presence of large, ideological,
and active groups may assist members of Congress by being a trustworthy source of information.
When Congress was debating The EPA1 Regulatory Act of 2011, which sought to nullify several
rules that limit commercial and industrial waste and pollution, 42 groups took public positions. In
turn, 18 Democrats and 86 Republicans expressed their support for this bill by becoming cosponsors.
One way of understanding this outcome is to examine the groups themselves.
Large and influential conservative interest groups such as FreedomWorks, Americans For Pros-
perity, and U.S. Chamber of Commerce uniformly sent messages to Congress urging members to
support the bill.
Unlike conservative groups, liberal groups had a split opinion on the issue. Labor unions like the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and the International Association of Machinists and
1Environmental Protection Agency
1
Aerospace Workers sent messages to Congress in support of the bill while environmental advocacy
groups like U.S. Climate Action Network and Natural Resources Defense Council voiced their strong
opposition to the bill.
This story is not unique; liberal interest groups are more likely to be organized around a single
issue than conservative groups (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Crosson, Furnas and Lorenz 2020).
When groups are organized around a single issue, they can conflict with each other even though
the groups generally lie on the same side of an ideological spectrum. In this study, I detail how
this dynamic causes liberal groups to conflict with each other more often which in turn causes
congressional Democrats to be more sensitive to the makeup of the coalition of groups supporting
bill.
Using data on interest groups’ positions on over 6,000 bills introduced between 2007 and 2017,
I show how Democrats require clearer signals than Republicans to become bill cosponsors, likely




2.1 THE INTEREST GROUP ENVIRONMENT
Interest groups, like legislators, can be conceived of as having ideal points which represent specific
preferences over policy. Recent efforts to generate ideal point scores for interest groups have generated
conflicting results. When weighting by campaign contributions, groups appear unimodal with a
center-right mean (Bonica 2013). However, when scoring based on public position taking, groups
display a bi-modal, polarized distribution that looks more similar to members of Congress (Crosson,
Furnas and Lorenz 2020). This is because the Democrats’ base consists of smaller, less well-funded,
single-issue groups, while the relatively fewer groups on the Republican side are generally larger,
more well funded, and are concerned about a variety of issues, which fall under the conservative
ideological umbrella (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Crosson, Furnas and Lorenz 2020).
The interest group bases of the different parties differ on both ideological and practical grounds;
the groups that constitute the Republican party can be understood as the vehicle of an ideological
movement, while the Democratic party represents a diverse coalition of social groups (Grossmann
and Hopkins 2016).
Rather than as one homogeneous system, interest groups exist in “two distinct and polarized
networks" of groups “starkly divided into polarized camps that funnel information to formal party
organizations" (Koger, Masket and Noel 2009, 633-634). What is more, the Democratic network is
more tightly connected, meaning that groups interact with each other more often (Koger, Masket
and Noel 2009). One reason Republican groups are less connected may be that the fact that there
are fewer of them means coordination requires less inter-group contact.
2.2 COSPONSORSHIP
Each bill introduced in Congress has exactly one sponsor, but, since 1967, members have been
able to cosponsor legislation as a way of showing their support. Even though cosponsorship has no
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direct effect on lawmaking, members still devote time and resources to identifying and cosponsoring
bills they favor (Koger 2003).
Since cosponsorship has no legally prescribed effect, it is easy to disregard congressional cospon-
sorship actives as “cheap-talk"; a costless, meaningless action that is not indicative of underlying
attitudes about an issue. While cosponsorship is a relatively low-cost form of Congressional action,
it does serve an important purpose.
Cosponsorship can be thought of as a signaling game, where members become cosponsors of a
bill to signal to agenda setters that the bill has a broad base of support and is worth expending
legislative capital to bring to the floor, since it is more likely to be successful than a bill without
cosponsors (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996). Recognizing this dynamic, interest groups actively solicit
members of Congress to cosponsor bills favorable to the interest group as a strategy of improving a
bill’s chances of legislative success either through messaging to agenda setters directly (Koger 2003;
Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Craig 2019) or shaping the agenda items important to voters
(Baumgartner et al. 2009).
2.3 CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO INTEREST GROUPS
Can interest group support of a bill encourage cosponsorship? Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson
and Craig (2019) use “Dear Colleague" letters to examine the impact of interest group connectedness
on marshaling support for a groups preferred policy. The authors find that when members of
Congress are told that powerful and well-connected interest groups support legislation, they are
more likely to cosponsor it.
Coalition diversity itself may also be an important heuristic for legislators. Ideologically diverse
interest group coalitions signal legislative viability to agenda setters who are therefore more likely to
advance bills with broad support (Lorenz 2020). This cuts against signalling arguments (e.g. Hansen
1991; Kessler and Krehbiel 1996) since it suggests coalitional diversity is an asset to legislative
advancement rather than a hindrance.
Interest groups may take positions on bills for reasons other than to induce cosponsorship.
Holyoke (2019) considers situations in which a lobbyist or interest group takes a position on a bill
based on the coalition of members of Congress supporting the bill since interest groups want to
support their legislative allies.
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Holyoke links bill cosponsorship to public positions taken by interest groups using the MapLight
Database1. However, his application stretches the applicability of the MapLight database. Since
interest group positions come from press releases, public statements and news appearances, it seems
to be the case that some of the position taking serves to galvanize popular or congressional support
for a bill, rather than as a post hoc way for lobbyists to ingratiate themselves with members of
Congress.
Additionally, Holyoke does not consider the opposite flow of causality: are there situations where
groups take positions to influence members of Congress? An interest group so malleable as to only
take cues from members of Congress would likely have a hard time attracting and retaining members.
In this study, I restrict my analysis to situations where groups have taken positions on bills
before a member of Congress has signaled their support by becoming a cosponsor. The presence of
these situations is the first indication that the post-hoc lobbying story is incomplete. The research
design of Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Craig (2019) also supports the group-first approach,
since it emphasizes the presence of groups in support of a bill in understanding a legislator’s decision
to cosponsor.
1I rely on the same database and discuss its structure later in the paper
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CHAPTER 3
GROUP SIGNALING AND PARTISANSHIP
Unlike members of Congress, groups, by their very nature, have fine-grained preferences over
policies enacted in the specific policy area that the group operates within. While a legislator seeks
to maintain the support of a majority of their constituents, a group represents a subset of those
constituents who are intense policy demanders on a specific issue. Groups achieve their demands in
part by appealing to legislators with a threat of a reward or punishment for adhering or deviating
from the groups’ preferred policy. Even if legislators are simply interested in good public policy,
listening to groups will assist them because groups have much better information on the impact of a
policy than legislators do (Epstein and O’Halloran 1995).
In his influential book Gaining Access, Hansen (1991) describes the relationship between interest
groups and legislators; interest groups offer to help legislators deal with electoral uncertainty by
providing “political intelligence" about the preferences of constituents and “political propaganda about
the performances of congressional representatives" (5). Legislators adjudicate by comparing interest
groups to other congressional informants as well as other interest groups. The metrics legislators
use to make this decision are competitive advantage and recurrence. Competitive advantage is
backward-looking at how the group’s advice has worked in the past while recurrence is the legislators
perception of how well a group’s advice will work in the future.
Interest groups are favorable sources of information as compared to local elites. Even before the
emergence of the legislator, groups have established networks and channels of communication from
constituents to elites whereas a new legislator would likely have to invest their own time and energy
in developing these networks. Interest groups also have an advantage compared to parties to the
extent that the group represents a large and homogeneous subset of constituents, since the groups
offer information and propaganda specifically targeted at that subset.
The information subsidy that groups provide to legislators has three parts. First, groups can
inform legislators about the policy positions and salience of issues for constituents. Second, the
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groups offer an explanation linking the bill in question to the preferences previously discussed.
Finally, the groups suggest a position on the bill (Hansen 1991).
While Hansen discusses the third step in the context of roll-call voting, this can be easily extended
to groups seeking cosponsorship as these three steps are present in many, if not most, of the public
positions collected as part of this study. However, the positions I am examining are generally
addressed to all members of Congress rather than a particular legislator. This makes the legislators’
adjudication even more important, since some interest groups may be speaking for constituencies
that are wholly unimportant to some legislators. This disadvantages groups relative to other sources
of information, since appeals are not narrowly targeted to reflect the electoral circumstances of a
specific legislator. This also may disadvantage liberal interest groups relative to conservative groups,
since conservative groups are more ideological (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016), giving them a broad
appeal to conservatives members of Congress. Liberals, on the other hand, will need to filter through
more parochial interest groups to determine if that specific interest is important to their constituents
or not.
Recurrence is also important to the partisan story. Legislators rely on repeat interaction with
groups to determine the usefulness of their information and propaganda. This too has the potential to
disadvantage Democrats, as their increased likelihood of contact with a larger number of issue-specific
groups may them less likely to have interacted with them in the past.
One way to for groups to build trust and recurrence is to cater to one party in particular. If a
group reliably messages to conservative politicians about conservative issues, Republican legislators
may be more likely to take heed of their messages in the future. Koger, Masket and Noel (2009)
show that this strategy of party alignment is utilized by some groups, while others seek to appeal to
both parties. This result may seem counterintuitive. In fact, many scholars have treated groups and
parties as rival forms of political organization. After all, groups are after narrow, self-serving, policy
goals while parties must create broad coalitions to stay in power. However, there is an advantage for
groups to associate with one party rather than seek to influence both:
(1) An issue may be “owned" by one party, so in order to achieve policy change on that issue, a
group must receive the support of the party that owns the issue. (2) Groups seeking to influence
legislators from both parties would face a credibility problem. Especially as congressional races
polarize, it can be challenging for groups to claim that they represent the potential voters of both
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parties. Facing these constraints, a group may decide to become closely aligned with one party. I
offer this as an explanation for the result of “polarized pluralism” observed by Crosson, Furnas and
Lorenz (2020) where interest groups are ideologically polarized similar to members of Congress.
Alternatively, subscribers to group-centric theories such as Bawn et al. (2012) believe that parties
are coalitions of interest groups who gain control of government to enact an agenda agreed upon
within the coalition. This view also supports the idea that interest groups will become associated
with a particular party, since agenda agreement is what binds coalitions together. If a group disagreed
with the coalition agenda, they would not be a part of the dominant coalition.
Due to divergent development of the parties, principally the conservative ideological sorting of
the Republican party, the types of groups associated with either party have important differences,
rather than being symmetrical reflections of each other (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016). Groups
in the Democrats’ base are more likely to be focused on a single issue (ex. Sierra Club or Planned
Parenthood) while groups in the Republican’s base are more likely to have a more broad array
of issues they care about that are constrained by ideology (ex. Heritage Foundation or Federalist
Society). Legislators rely on these partisan networks to arrive at the “right" decision on legislative
issues when they would otherwise have to look elsewhere for signals (Epstein and O’Halloran 1995).
The party differences create a dynamic where Republicans are more likely to have a “one stop
shop" or a group that they know provides reliable signals (information or propaganda), whereas
Democrats have to contend with more groups. Democrats must expend more energy to determine
if a group is indeed in touch with the legislators’ constituents enough that their information is
reliable. Put simply, the Democrats are less likely to be in a game with repeat play, so they face
more concerns about credibility on the part of groups.
Since Democrats have a harder time determining credible signals, they will be more wary of
coalitions that are ideologically dissimilar to them. As a coalition’s mean ideal point becomes
further away from a legislator’s, Democratic legislators will be more sensitive to this change than
Republicans. While both parties prefer legislation close to their ideal point, Democrats will be less
willing to endorse legislation supported by ideologically dissimilar coalitions since Democrats have a
harder time determining if interest groups are being truthful with the information they send. This
will also cause Democrats to become less likely to cosponsor legislation as the standard deviation
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of the ideal points in a coalition becomes larger since larger standard deviation indicates a wider
ideological array of supporters who may not be sending truthful signals.
Additionally, Democrats will be more likely to receive conflicting signals from multiple groups
representing different coalitions within the Democratic base. This is because the issue positions
of the Democratic base display less constraint than those of the Republican base, at least at the
interest group level (Crosson, Furnas and Lorenz 2020).
This will lead Democrats to be less responsive to interest group signals, even if the interest group
is in their base, since: (1) signals may conflict, necessitating that Democrats be unresponsive to at
least one group, (2) Democrats will falsely reject a credible group signal since they are unable to
determine if it is a credible one or not, or (3) the group will not have enough resources (money or
connections) to transmit a signal.
3.1 HYPOTHESES
To assess the degree to which partisan differences in interest group coalitions exist and impact
policymaking, I propose the following hypotheses:
H1: In aggregate, Democratic-aligned groups will take more positions than Republican
aligned groups
H2: On any given issue, the Democratic-aligned groups will be more likely than those of
Republicans to take conflicting positions
H3: Increases in the standard deviation of coalition ideal points and coalition-legislator





This paper makes use of an underutilized data source from a non-profit, non-partisan organization
called Maplight. For the 110th - 114th Congress, “Maplight has collected and coded over 130,000
expressions of support and opposition made by over 16,000 unique organizations with respect to
nearly 10,000 unique bills... These positions come from public statements (e.g., on organizations’
websites), open letters to Congress, news stories, congressional hearing testimony, and other publicly
observable sources" (Lorenz, Furnas and Crosson 2020).
This database has the advantage of coding, not only if a group took a position, but also the
valance of the position as well as the exact date when the group publicized the position. However, it
is not without its drawbacks. The 130,000 positions do not constitute the universe of positions that
were likely taken during the time period studied. Maplight itself states that they do not attempt to
collect information about commemorative bills, but this likely cannot account for all of the bills that
are not included in the data set. Lorenz, Furnas and Crosson (2020) investigate bill and sponsor-level
characteristics that may systematically influence if a bill is included in the Maplight dataset or not.
They find that “Bills introduced in later Congresses, that have large numbers of cosponsors, that
are multiply referred, or that attain some level of legislative advancement (or that get passed by
Congress and then vetoed) are also more likely to be MapLight bills" (17). Although the bias the
authors find concerning cosponsorship is small there is still a selection effect. Because cosponsorship
is the dependent variable of the study, this will serve to attenuate, or “flatten", the results that I
obtain (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). While this is sub-optimal, it does serve to create a harder
case for my empirical tests, so the risk of finding significance where there should be none is not
inflated due to selection.
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While the range of Congresses was selected because of data availability, the period from the
110th - 114th Congress has desirable levels of variation; it spans two presidential administrations and
both Democrats and Republicans controlled each chamber at some point in this period1.
4.1 IGscores
These position taking data are used by Crosson, Furnas and Lorenz (2020) to construct ideal-point
estimates for legislators and groups on the same scale, called IGscores. To do so, the authors assume
“that groups and legislators render opinions on bills based on a quadratic loss utility function such
that they vote ’yay’ (Y) or ’nay’ (N) based on their spatial proximity to the bill, with some error"
(5). Crosson, Furnas and Lorenz address possible issues with data scarcity by relying on k-core
filtration, which only includes groups that have taken at least five positions on bills that have at
least five positions taken on them by groups that also meet this criteria. This results in 2,014 bills
which are then matched with roll-call data, which is available for 1,035 of the bills. The authors
then use Bayesian IRT ideal point estimation to generate the IGscore.
The scores are scaled from -4 to 4, with higher scoring groups being more conservative than
lower scoring groups. The analysis is substantially similar when using DW-NOMINATE to measure
legislator ideology, and the two measures are correlated at .977.
Categorizing groups as “conflicting" requires an arbitrary determination of which groups are
liberal or conservative. While IGscores are not a measure of ideology, they are do conform with a
priori expectations about relative ideology, placing conservative groups to the right (higher scores)
than liberal groups. In this paper, I use 0 as a cut point between liberal and conservative groups
because it evenly cleaves the scale in order to make statements about conflicting signals from interest
groups. The regression analysis I use has the benefit of not relying on this arbitrary decision.
Additionally, the regression model does not require the assumption that IGscores have a cardinal
meaning, only that the scores are ordinally valid and that legislators and groups can be scored on
the same dimension.
4.2 BILL SIGNIFICANCE AND COSPONSORSHIP
Additionally, I include bill significance as a control. I use categorizations by Volden and Wiseman
(2014), which classify bills as commemorative, substantive, or substantive and significant.
1Democratic House: 110, 111; Democratic Senate: 110-113; Republican House: 112-114; Republican Senate: 114.
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First, the distributions of IGscores among interest groups conforms with the expectation that
conservative groups have less dispersion than their liberal counterparts. In Figure 5.1, I show
the IGscore distribution unweighted, weighted by number of positions an organization takes, and
weighted by the logged number of positions.
Figure 5.1: Ideological Distribution of Interest Groups Using IGscore
Figure from Crosson, Furnas and Lorenz (2020)
This figure shows that, when weighting by position, the distribution moves slightly away from
the center, indicating that more active groups are less centrist than the average group.
For each position in my dataset, I examine the IGscore distribution of groups based on if the bill
they are supporting is sponsored by a Republican or a Democrat. The results are shown in Figure
5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Group IGscore by Sponsor of Bill
Figure 5.2 shows that there is a broader range of groups taking positions on Democratic bills
than on Republican bills. For instance, there is a peak in the blue line around 1 on the x-axis,
which represents conservative groups taking a position in support of a bill introduced by a Democrat.
Additionally, the modal peak for the Democrats is slightly wider than that of the Republicans. This
supports the idea that Democratic legislators must contend with a wider ideological range of signals
than Republicans when deciding which bills to support.
Unlike previous studies, for each bill-member pair, I record statistics about the coalition of
interest groups supporting a bill (count, mean, standard deviation) for only those groups which have
taken a position prior to the member becoming a cosponsor. This relies on the assumption that the
future cannot affect the past, and alleviates some concerns about the causal flow working in the
opposite direction, as in, groups support bills based on members of Congress who are cosponsors
(Holyoke 2019).
Using this method, I show in Figure 5.3 the distributions of the mean position of bills that
members observed when deciding to cosponsor, separated by party.
Figure 5.3 differs from Figure 5.2 in two important ways. First, Figure 5.3 is time-restricted,
so positions taken after a member cosponsors a bill are eliminated. Second, Figure 5.3 captures
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Figure 5.3: Mean Coalition IGscore Density by Bill Sponsor
a coalition-level mean IGscore, where Figure 5.2 aggregates all group positions. The differences
between the two figures show that, while Democrats receive a wider array of signals than Republicans,
they act on a narrower array of signals. This is one indication that Democrats may be more sensitive
to coalitional characteristics like ideal point than Republicans.
Next, I examine how often members of Congress are exposed to messages of both support and
opposition by interest groups within their base. I call this “party conflict". Democrats experience party
conflict on 8.68% of bills where Republicans experience conflict on 6.46% of bills (t = 5.415, p < .001).
To examine these trends more fully, I utilize regression analysis and introduce new variables.
First, I code for what I call “party conflict". This variable captures if separate groups with the same
partisan alignment have taken positions in both support and opposition of a bill. I also record the
absolute value of the difference between a member’s IGscore and the mean IGscore of the coalition
supporting a bill.
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I specify a logistic regression1 with fixed effects for session where the dependant variable is a
member’s decision to cosponsor a bill. The results are reported in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Logistic Odds Ratios Predicting Cosponsorship
The non-interacted independent variables all have the expected effect. Bills that have higher
standard deviation, are further away from a member’s ideal point, and are proposed by a member of
the opposite party all have lower rates of cosponsorship than the relevant comparison. Additionally,
1One major drawback of the logit model is that it requires the assumption of independent and identically distributed
random variables. In this application, this assumption requires that the decision of one member to cosponsor does not
induce other members to cosponsor. While this problem has often been ignored in literature using cosponsorship as a
dependant variable (e.g. Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Craig 2019), it is important
to recognize the limitations of this method.
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when a member receives both messages of support and opposition from a group, this makes them
less likely to cosponsor a bill.
The interacted terms help to elucidate partisan differences in the effect of coalitional changes.
Republicans are less responsive to coalition-member ideological difference but more responsive to
coalition conflict.
Perhaps the most striking variable where parties diverge is the coalition standard deviation,
where higher values represent a wider distribution of ideal points within the coalition. Figure 5.5
depicts the predicted probability of cosponsorship over the range of coalition standard deviations,
separated by party.
Figure 5.5: Predicted Probability for Standard Deviation and Ideological Distance
Figure 5.5 shows that, as coalition standard deviation increases, Democrats become less likely
to cosponsor legislation, while Republicans become more likely. There are multiple potential
explanations for this finding.
It could be that Democrats seek to cosponsor legislation with narrow, particularistic coalitions,
whereas Republicans seek out larger coalitions before cosponsoring a bill.
The right plot confirms that Democrats and Republicans have roughly the same sensitivity to
ideological differences. However, the slope of the blue line is steeper, indicating that Democrats




From this analysis, it is clear that parties have different responses to interest group coalition
features. Other scholars (Grossmann and Dominguez 2009; Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Crosson,
Furnas and Lorenz 2020) have characterized the interest group bases of America’s political parties. I
apply these characterizations to the coalitions that form behind bills introduced in Congress and show
that interest group level differences translate to coalitional differences. These coalitions demonstrate
many of the same features scholars have observed in interest groups themselves. Liberal groups
contradict other liberal groups significantly more often than conservative groups contradict each
other and take positions on a wider range of bills than conservative groups do.
I posit that these differences are due to the underlying makeup of the different party bases. Since
Democrats have a broader base, they are more likely to face coalitional conflict; Democratic interest
groups therefore face more of a credibility problem than Republican groups. This in turn causes
congressional Democrats to have a strong preference for close coalition-legislator ideal point matches
and an aversion to coalitions with high standard deviation.
Scholars have long recognized the importance of interest group influence to congressional cospon-
sorship and the policymaking process more broadly but have largely neglected to understand how
interest group and coalition-level attributes affect parties differently. In this study, I characterize
coalitions for each bill-member pair and investigate how coalition-level characteristics such as ideo-
logical mean, ideological standard deviation, and coalition conflict influence decisions to cosponsor
bills. I find that Democrats are more responsive than Republicans to changes in ideological distance,
standard deviation, and coalition conflict. This finding largely supports previous theories about
how legislators adjudicate between interest group signals and suggests that Democrats respond to
difficulty in determining which interest group signals are reliable by being more selective about
coalition-level characteristics. This in turn hurt interest groups’ ability to advance their legislative
agendas through the practice of soliciting bill cosponsors.
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APPENDIX A
ASSESSING CENTRALITY USING NETWORK MEASURES
Scholars have conflicting expectations about how both interest group size and specialization
impact legislator uptake of group signals. For example, Hansen (1991) says “Under most conditions,
more specialized interest groups perform the tasks of information and propaganda more efficiently
than their less specialized counterparts” (102). However, larger groups may have more resources for
information gathering and propagandizing, and may interact more with legislators, giving them more
ability to build trust. In this appendix, I propose using network measures of centrality to quantify
specialized versus generalist interest groups and centrality’s relationship to group ideal point scores
and cosponsorship.
A.1 PREVIOUS RESEARCH INTO COSPONSORSHIP NETWORKS
Out of the many legislative applications for network methodology, scholars have been perhaps most
eager to use network methods to understand cosponsorship in the U.S. Congress. The advantages
are obvious; a long cosponsorship record is collected and maintained by the Library of Congress.
While the use of cosponsorship as an edge indicative of a social connection remains controversial,
studies have shown that cosponsorship patterns do not map cleanly onto measures of party voting
like DW-NOMINATE (Talbert and Potoski 2002), suggesting that more than party voting influences
patterns of cosponsorship.
Fowler (2006) studies social networks between legislators based on their cosponsosorship patterns.
He finds that the strongest ties are institutional (between committee chairs and ranking members
while regional, issue-based and personal ties also play a role in influencing the propensity of a
legislator to cosponsor others’ bills.
A.2 HYPOTHESES
H1: Interest group ideal point conservatism will positively correlate with eigenvector
centrality and BiRank.
H2: The higher the coalition maximum centrality, the more likely members will be to
cosponsor
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For H2, I focus on the maximum centrality score (either eigenvector or BiRank) since most
scholars focus on the theoretical importance of large interest groups (Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson
and Craig 2019).
It is apparent to any observer of Congress that not all interest group cues are created equal. Some
groups, through their size or wealth, are able to send more credible signals than others. A group that
can believably claim to represent 50,000 constituents will likely have more sway than one with 5,000.
Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Craig (2019) propose that “Endorsements from groups that are
more well connected within the advocacy community send stronger signals in the earliest stages of
the legislative process when there are large number of bills competing for a member’s attention"
(164).
Using my position taking dataset, I construct a bipartite network where nodes can be split into
two groups: interest groups and bills. Edges, which represent positions, only lie between groups.
Eigenvector centrality of a group is λxi =
∑n
j=1 aijxj where aij = 1 if groups have a connection
to a bill and 0 otherwise, λ is the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, and x is the group’s
centrality (Jackson 2010). Eigenvector centrality relies on the concept that connections to high-
scoring nodes contribute more to the score of the node in question than equal connections to
low-scoring nodes.
While Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Craig (2019) use eigenvector centrality to calculate
social power, my use of a bipartite model slightly changes the interpretation. First, since bills are also
nodes in this model, I am able to calculate eigenvector centrality for bills as well as interest groups.
Second, since groups cannot connect to groups and bills cannot connect to bills, the interpretation
of the eigenvector centrality for groups is that groups with higher eigenvector centrality scores take
positions on bills which also receive positions from many other interest groups.
Recently, scholars have been interested in generating measures of centrality in bipartite networks
(He et al. 2016; Taheri et al. 2017). This problem is particularly pressing given the fact that
traditional measures, such as eigenvector centrality can provide misleading results, since they do not
account for the fact that nodes cannot connect to nodes of their same type (Latapy, Magnien and
Del Vecchio 2008).
In this study, I utilize both eigenvector centrality and BiRank, which similarly relies on the
smoothness convention that “a vertex (from one side) should be ranked high if it is connected to
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Organization BiRank
U.S. Chamber of Commerce .000537
AFL-CIO .000451
Consumer Federation of America .000398
National Association of Manufacturers .000388
American Bankers Association .000369
Table A.1: Top Five Organizations by BiRank
Organization Eigenvector Centrality
U.S. Chamber of Commerce .313
National Association of Manufacturers .192
AFL-CIO .146
National Taxpayers Union .131
Americans for Tax Reform .127
Table A.2: Top Five Organizations by Eigenvector Centrality
higher-ranked vertices (from the other side)" (He et al. 2016, 59). However, BiRank presents several
potential benefits over eigenvector centrality tailored to bipartite models. Specifically, the algorithm
iteratively moves through the network to calculate centrality, like eignevector centrality, however, it
ranks based on the structure of nodes within both modes of the graph simultaneously. The ranking
is therefore based on “ each node’s walk distance to other nodes in the graph, each node’s estimated
centrality during the prior iteration of the bipartite algorithm, and the most recent rank estimates
of each node’s connection on the other mode of the graph" (Aronson et al. 2020, 3).
BiRank specifically is a propagation-based method that divides each edge by the square root
degree of the source node and the square root degree of the target node prior to iteration (He
et al. 2016). Importantly, BiRank allows “edges connected to a high-degree vertex to be suppressed
through normalization, lessening the contribution of high-degree vertices. This has the beneficial
effect of toning down the dependence of top rankings on high-degree vertices" (59).
The network only consists of bills and groups; in this analysis I do not directly address a group’s
propensity to influence cosponsorship or legislation. Accordingly, centrality scores do not reflect
groups that hold high levels of sway in the Washington community. Rather, a group could take
positions on a wide range of bills to increase their centrality, even if these positions were totally
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disregarded by legislators. With that stipulation, it is still the case that groups with the highest
centrality scores are generally regarded as influential, as evidenced by the figures above.
Figure A.1: Logistic Odds Ratios Predicting Cosponsorship Including BiRank
This table shows that coalitions that include groups with large centrality scores are more
successful in prompting cosponsorship, but that these effects differ by party. Compared to Democrats,
Republicans are less likely to cosponsor legislation as the BiRank increases. To better understand
this relationship, I present a predicted probability graph with 95% confidence interval below:
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Figure A.2: Predicted Probability of Cosponsorship Varying by BiRank
This figure shows that, while the propensity of a Republican stays roughly constant as more
central groups join a coalition, Democrats become more likely to cosponsor.
Measuring the centrality provides a good opportunity to test theories about broad versus narrow
interest group focus. If conservative groups do generally have a broader focus than liberal ones
(Grossmann and Hopkins 2016), they will have higher centrality scores.
This figure does not completely comport with H2. Rather, it displays a V-shaped distribution
where groups on either extreme are more likely to have a higher BiRank. This suggests that groups
that take more positions are more extreme. This is consistent with the polarization that I observed
when examining the IGscore distributions weighted by number of positions taken.
A.3 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
H1 finds a modest level of support. In both specifications of the logit model (eigenvector centrality
and BiRank), the odds ratio for the measure of centrality is above 1, meaning that as the maximum
centrality of a group increases, members are more likely to cosponsor. Both findings are significant
at the 99% level.
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Figure A.3: IGscore versus Eignevector Centrality
H2 finds less support. IGscore and Birank are only correlated at .2031. Therefore, coalition
conservatism and and centrality are not strongly related.
Measures of network centrality present a promising avenue for quantifying specialization of
interest groups. Studying legislators’ response to central groups can help scholars understand how
legislators make the tradeoff between specialized and generalist interest groups when deciding which
legislation to support.
1EVC and IGscore are correlated at .121
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